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How does an approach towards transitional justice produce preconditions
for a country’s international action, enabling certain policies and practices
in the immediate neighborhood and international society at large? This ar-
ticle unpacks ontological security-seeking as a generic social mechanism in
international politics, which makes it possible to productively conceptual-
ize the connection between a state’s transitional justice and foreign poli-
cies. Going beyond the dichotomy of transitional justice compliance and
noncompliance by gauging the role of states’ subjective sense of self in
driving their behavior, I develop an analytical framework to explain how
state ontological security-seeking relates to major transitions and conse-
quent state identity disjuncture, the ensuing politics of truth-and-justice-
seeking, and its international resonance in framing and executing partic-
ular foreign policies. I offer a typology of the international consequences
of states’ transitional justice politics, distinguishing between reflective and
mnemonical security-oriented approaches, spawning cooperative and con-
flictual foreign policy behavior, respectively. The empirical purchase of
the purported nexus is illustrated with the example of post-Soviet Russia’s
limited politics of accountability toward the repressions of its antecedent
regime and its increasingly self-assertive and confrontational stance in con-
temporary international politics.
Keywords: foreign policy, inefficient causation, ontological secu-
rity, Russia, transitional justice
Transitional justice (TJ) is a multidisciplinary approach to redressing past human
rights violations and international crimes in the postconflict or post-authoritarian
/-totalitarian setting through a variety of judicial and nonjudicial means of account-
ability. The discourse on TJ has gained global normative proportions over the past
two decades, and its mechanisms have become increasingly institutionalized as gen-
eral obligations of accountability for the past, required as a matter of constitutional
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and/or international law (Teitel 2014, 181; Ben-Josef Hirsch 2014). The United
Nations (UN) endorses the “right to the truth,” affirming that “[e]very people has
the inalienable right to know the truth about past events concerning the perpetra-
tion of heinous crimes and about the circumstances and reasons that led, through
massive or systematic violations, to the perpetration of those crimes” (UN 2005).
Measures, such as truth commissions, have spread worldwide and become insti-
tutionalized at the international level and by major nongovernmental organiza-
tions (e.g., Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Center for
Transitional Justice) (Ben-Josef Hirsch 2014). International TJ advocacy has signif-
icantly broadened its scope from mechanisms dealing with past violence to post-
conflict peace accords, ushering in democracy, rule of law, and a culture of human
rights (Subotic´ 2012). An emerging general obligation of accountability for the past
should theoretically have concrete policy implications for individual states. How-
ever, states remain bound by the allegedly global normative imperative to reckon
with their past human rights abuses and international crimes to vastly varying de-
grees in practice.
While compartments of literature have addressed case-specific bilateral and re-
gional ripples of individual truth-and-justice-seeking measures (e.g., Gardner Feld-
man 2012), the connection between states’ (non-)adoption of particular TJ mea-
sures domestically and their foreign policies remains yet to be systematically concep-
tualized. This article outlines a novel analytical framework for linking states’ politics
of truth-and-justice-seeking with their foreign policy discourse and practice. What
is the meaning and function of a state’s reckoning with the antecedent regime’s
human rights violations for its international conduct? How does a state’s adoption
or non-adoption of (a core set of) TJ measures influence its international outlook
and foreign policy? And how is a state’s TJ politics affected by its self-perceived posi-
tion in the international society in turn? Addressing these questions continues the
extensive conversation in IR on the international effects and sources of domestic
politics (the “Second Image” and the “Second Image Reversed,” Gourevitch 1978),
while acknowledging the difficult balancing act of states between domestic and in-
ternational imperatives.
Ontological security-seeking, I argue, makes it possible to productively concep-
tualize the connection and synergy between states’ TJ and foreign policies. The
concept of ontological security (OS) has traveled along the customary disciplinary
trajectory from social theory (Giddens 1991; see also Laing 1960) to international
relations (IR), wherein the applications and critical engagements thereof have pro-
duced a rich and growing literature (see particularly Huysmans 1998; Kinnvall 2004;
Lupovici 2012, 2016; Mitzen 2006; Steele 2008; Rumelili 2015a, 2015b; Subotic´ 2016;
“Ontological Securities in World Politics” 2017). In IR applications of this notion,
OS signifies a sense of a continuous and stable self (as a society or a state), having
that sense confirmed by others, and being thus reassured about one’s own continu-
ity in the world. TJ as a particular international normative domain entails specific
challenges to a state’s continuous sense of self and is, therefore, consequential for
state behavior.
I bring together the deepened and broadened understanding of cause (Kurki
2008), interpretive process tracing (Guzzini 2012, 2017), and inefficient causation
(Lebow 2014) in order to unpack OS-seeking as a generic social mechanism in in-
ternational politics, accounting for the causal relationship between TJ as a set of
international normative expectations and foreign policy as state behavior. Proceed-
ing from the assumption that the emerging global normative expectations related
to the states’ duty to come to terms with their violent legacies (Teitel 2014) present
distinctive challenges to the sustenance of their continuous sense of self, I develop
an analytical framework in order to explain how state OS-seeking (i) relates to major
transitions and consequent state identity disjuncture; (ii) the politics of truth-and-
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its related grappling with various pressures on its continuity;1 and (iii) the interna-
tional resonance of the chosen TJ policies in a state’s pursuance of specific notions
of order and justice in international politics. Interlinking the adoption of partic-
ular TJ measures and state OS-seeking in international politics improves both the
understanding of system-level conditions enabling or constraining state’s reckoning
with the antecedent regime’s legacy and the international implications of the cho-
sen politics of truth-and-justice-seeking. The admittance that the overall knowledge
on even just the state-level effects of TJ still remains “insufficient” (Thoms et al.
2010) does not curb my main objective to pinpoint a basic typology of the interna-
tional consequences of states’ TJ politics. The article brings a state’s approach to TJ;
its security/foreign policy imaginary, or a “structure of well-established meanings
and social relations out of which representations about the world of international
relations are created” (Weldes 1999, 10); and consequent practices into a loop of
mutual dependence and productivity.
My aim is to operationalize OS-seeking by developing pointers for empirical
analysis, highlighting the distinct challenges created by fundamental transitions
for states’ normative and spatial continuity and their subsequent autobiograph-
ical narratives thereof. I offer a simple taxonomy of pursuing the politics of
truth-and-justice-seeking in “transition states,” distinguishing between reflective and
mnemonical security-oriented approaches. The former tends to contribute toward
a more systematic and comprehensive adoption of a range of TJ measures, laying,
in turn, the basis for a more cooperative stance in a state’s foreign policy outlook.
The mnemonical security-orientation of a state, however, seeks to fix certain under-
standings of the past in social memory in order to keep a particular perception of
the state’s past self intact and secure for the present needs (Mälksoo 2015a, 222). If
a state’s dealing with its repressive legacies is geared toward the safeguarding and
securitization of its glorious memories and “useful past” at the expense of engag-
ing with the more problematic chapters in its history, self-interrogation and reflec-
tiveness tend to be actively discouraged, and the adoption of TJ measures remains
limited or highly selective. The calls to revisit a state’s past self are thus resisted, the
alternative approaches depicted as dangerous and undermining for the state’s sense
of ontological continuity, leading eventually to a more confrontational stance vis-à-
vis the perceived challengers of the state’s dominant self-narrative in international
society.2
The suggested framework has major policy implications. The mnemonical
security-orientation of influential state actors may incentivize international TJ norm
entrepreneurs to tone down pressures for state accountability for historical (and
more recent) crimes as a way to avoid counterproductive overreactions on the part
of the said state and to open up space for concessions on other relevant policy is-
sues. Such strategic action on the part of international TJ advocates does not make
it possible to evade the fundamental question about the ethics of dealing with the
past, however. A reflective approach to TJ embraces what Viet Thanh Nguyen (2013,
2016) calls “ethical memory”—memory work that recalls both one’s own and others
by recognizing the concurrent humanity and inhumanity in one’s self and the “oth-
ers.” Since such memory work is more conducive to international relations based
on mutual empathy and understanding, a reflective approach to TJ should logically
be at the heart of the respective normative persuasion attempts of global TJ norm
entrepreneurs.
I delineate my points in the three substantive parts of this article. In the first,
I outline the rationale for moving beyond the rationalist cost-benefit calculation
1
Whereas state “identity” and “continuity” are understood as identical in international law, IR theoretical schools
assign concrete properties to state identities, such as rational ego-drivenness or various role characteristics.
2
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in accounting for why and how states engage with global norms. As a counter-
point to the literature on the instrumental use of norms, an OS-based framework
sheds light on the occasionally conflicting calls of states’ identity maintenance
and status-seeking in their engagement with TJ. Next, I lay out a conceptual and
methodological framework for studying the relationship between state’s TJ and for-
eign policies, with OS-seeking as a causal mechanism linking the two in an interpre-
tivist process (cf. Guzzini 2017). In the third part, the TJ and foreign policy nexus is
illustrated with the example of post-Soviet Russia’s limited politics of accountability
toward the repressions of its antecedent regime and its increasingly self-assertive
and confrontational stance in contemporary international politics. The conclu-
sion recaps the contributions of the article and points at some avenues for further
research.
A Case for an Ontological Security Perspective
TJ has emerged as a “global project”—a body of customary international law and a
set of normative standards (Nagy 2008, 276). A constructivist take on norms as “stan-
dards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” implies a moral obli-
gation, enabling (albeit not determining) a particular behavior (Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998, 891; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003/04, 8). The patchy application of
the alleged normative duty to undergo TJ by important states (such as Russia) calls
for probing the role of a state’s perceived standing and unique power3 position
during and after the transition.4 Scholars have shown how states’ distinct rankings
in various social and normative hierarchies expose states to the constraints and de-
mands of specific international norms to different degrees (Towns and Rumelili
2017). Others have highlighted how leaders’ legal justifications regarding partic-
ular international norms and their favored principles “cannot be divorced from
wider conceptions of position, status, and recognition within the international sys-
tem” (Allison 2013, 10). States’ adherence to an international norm, emergent or
consolidated, might furthermore be bounded by the governing elites’ fears of com-
promising state sovereignty or resistance from a domestic populace (Cortell and
Davis 2000, 74–75; cf. Mälksoo 2015).
Two streams of scholarship in particular have made important advances in prob-
lematizing norm diffusion as top-down international socialization. The literature on
the instrumental use of norms highlights how international norms can be adhered
to, and used, in order to achieve certain policy goals or to shape the content of the
norm itself (Dixon 2017). States use normative manipulation and mimicry (Hyde
2011); join treaties for self-interested reasons rather than due to deep identification
with constituent obligations (Bower 2015, 353); and engage in transnational “norm
proxy wars” to undermine increasingly hegemonic, yet internally contested, human
rights norms (Sanders 2016). Dixon (2017) shows that beyond simply complying
with or violating a norm, states’ responses to international norms can vary from
contestation, resistance, and (seeming) compliance in multiple ways. Whether ac-
tors regard a norm as strong or weak and the type of rhetorical adaptation they
consequently employ, ranging from norm disregard to norm avoidance, norm in-
terpretation, or norm signaling, considerably improves the understanding of how
3
I pursue a broadly constructivist understanding of power as relational, intersubjective, and social authority, for
valued resources and measures of power are socially defined and contextually bound (Pouliot 2016, 78–81).
4
While liberal democratic transitions implicitly constitute the paradigmatic transition of TJ (Teitel 2000, 5;
McAuliffe 2011), the very label has been applied to various empirical contexts, for example, those not involving lib-
eral political transition, or any political transition at all, as well as to liberal Western democracies that have used certain
measures from the TJ toolbox (Sharp 2015, 156). Defining what period qualifies as the transition for which TJ might be
relevant is therefore highly case-specific: most definitions of TJ leave the supposed end point of transitions unspecified
(Roht-Arriaza and Marieqcurrena 2006, 1). TJ can accordingly happen in various spells, stretched over a long period of
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states might seek to avoid charges of norm violation or to resist pressures for com-
pliance (Dixon 2017, 83–84).
Meanwhile, an alternative framework provided by Zarakol (2014) has significantly
deepened our understanding of why such behavior might occur (cf. Epstein 2012).
Offering an important caveat for Risse and Sikkink’s (1999) international social-
ization model for understanding the domestic adaptation and internalization of
international norms, Zarakol puts forth a persuasive argument for figuring out
both norm-compliance and norm-rejection by non-Western states (including Rus-
sia) through the dynamic of stigmatization instead. Modern international society
has accordingly been fundamentally shaped by stigmatization as non-Westerners
joined the system at a disadvantage (regardless of their formally colonized status
in history) with major consequences for their modern national narratives and state
identities (Zarakol 2014, 312–13). In case of stigmatization, or the “internalisation
of a particular normative standard that defines one’s own attributes as undesirable”
(Zarakol 2014, 314), the response of the norm-taker “is much more likely to be
failed attempts at correction, overcompensation, or a stubborn denial that a prob-
lem exists” (Zarakol 2014, 317).
These insights on norm takers’ logic of action provide a stepping stone for an OS
framework developed here. An OS perspective assumes that states do not just seek
to survive and surpass: they want to persist as particular kind of actors. Rational-
ist explanations generally underestimate the centrality of norm-takers’ sense of self
for intentional action. Identity is deemed a given functional asset in a strategic ex-
change rather than a constitutive feature of state preferences, and the “self” in self-
interest is largely left unengaged. However, assuming that social action and interac-
tion are fundamentally constituted by actors’ striving for a stable self-understanding
and a consistent subject-position, points at the more profound identity costs related
to the expectations about coming to terms with one’s past (Zarakol 2010, 7). A ra-
tionalist perspective can factor in the political costs of going against the grain of
the TJ norm, but it reaches a limit in accounting for the ontological costs related
to the pressures to revise a particular definition of the state self. While minimizing
the disturbance of identity ruptures might in principle be subjected to cost-benefit
calculations, state identity sustenance requirements can contradict, and arguably
outweigh, conventionally conceived material interests.
An OS framework highlights that the use of norms for instrumental ends does
not happen independently of states’ subjective sense of self: it is bound by states’
historical sensitivities toward the particular origin of norms, with related status anx-
ieties and recognition-seeking (Zarakol 2014). It is therefore crucial to gauge how a
state’s sense of self interacts with the emerging TJ norm and to what effect. Bringing
under scrutiny norm-takers’ intersubjective meanings of the duty to come to terms
with one’s past, an OS framework adds causal depth to states’ TJ engagement, shed-
ding light on the ontological costs of reckoning with past crimes for states under-
going fundamental identity ruptures. An instrumental approach and an OS-based
perspective can converge on the adoption of specific TJ measures, not necessarily
indicating the internalization of the norm. The seeming compliance with the inter-
national expectation to come to terms with one’s violent and repressive past could
amount to emulation and, in fact, substantive contestation of the respective norm
(Mälksoo 2015b). An instrumental approach and an OS-centric perspective diverge
on the ontological premises of why such behavior might occur and on allocating
relatively different importance on state identity management needs for its stable
agency.
As an analytic venture, an OS framework on TJ norm-engagement is more at-
tentive to the historical development of state preferences and identities, allowing
for a nuanced and comprehensive appraisal of the social dimensions of states’ in-
ternational behavior. It can further point to different explanations: while, at times,
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TJ-related normative expectations, it can decisively deviate from the pursuance of
material interests in norm compliance at others. Engaging an OS perspective on
states’ responses to international norms thus adds a critical counterpoint to the
scholarship on how states instrumentally manipulate, use, and change norms be-
yond the consequentialist means and ends calculations about a conventionally pre-
sumed state interest.
The case of post-Soviet Russia illuminates the role of historical memory in the
OS-seeking struggles of states caught between the liberal premises of the allegedly
globalizing norm of coming to terms with one’s past and a quest for sustaining
a continuous self-concept as a great power, regardless of the mismatch between
the traditional and contemporary normative connotations attached to it (Neumann
2005). The anxiety about, and resistance to the full-blown adoption of the TJ norm
in the Russian case is simultaneously expressive of the country’s self-consciousness
and contestation of its historically ostracized position in the modern international
society.5
Yet, we do not know sufficiently about the processes and mechanisms whereby
state’s identity interacts with the emerging general obligation of accountability for
the past, and the consequent policy effects of such interaction. Extrapolating from
the existing literature on the nature of the connection between historical memory,
TJ and foreign policy, the effects of historical memory on international relations
range from indirect (through shaping identities and values that the foreign policy
makers bring into the process of decision-making) to concrete historical “lessons”
and analogies drawn on inmaking a particular foreign policy decision (Müller 2002;
Lebow, Kansteiner, Fogu 2006; Olick 2007; Langenbacher 2010, 38–39). The im-
pact of historical memory on the international behavior of states has been studied
in extensive detail in the contexts of post–Second World War Germany and Japan
(e.g., Berger 2012; Gardner Feldman 2012; Lind 2008; Buruma 1994; Hagström
2015; Gustafsson 2016). These cases are generally quoted as examples revealing
the connection between countries’ ways of coming to terms with past violence and
the prospects for international reconciliation. This connection is not straightfor-
ward, however, as Lind’s (2008) study on international apologies and their potential
domestic backlashes has demonstrated. While contrition is likely to reduce threat
perception and promote reconciliation, apologies are not prerequisites of interna-
tional reconciliation. Forgetting, denying, or glorifying past atrocities nonetheless
tends to elevate threat perception and inhibit reconciliation in international rela-
tions, as such practices signal contempt for victimized country’s people, its status
in international society, and the future of the bilateral relationship between the
former perpetrator and victim state (Lind 2008, 9, 13).
I propose OS-seeking as a causal mechanism for explaining the complex interplay
between external pressures and internal demands on state’s sense of self in order
to account for the relationship and synergy between state’s TJ and foreign policy.
In IR applications of OS theory, states are presumed to seek a stable sense of self
to realize their continuous agency. For states in transition, global normative expec-
tations related to TJ challenge an urge to sustain the continuity of the known state
self. Unpacking the ways a state’s TJ politics is entangled with its status concerns
and the related search for recognition of its preferred international standing thus
becomes paramount for substantiating the TJ-foreign policy nexus.
5
On Russia’s search for a modern mnemonic narrative of the Soviet legacy through the lens of mimesis during
the brief Medvedev interlude in the Kremlin, see Mälksoo (2015b). In the rhetorical adaptation parlance, this episode
could also be read as an example of concurrent TJ norm-signaling in combination with the substantive norm disregard
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This section outlines an analytical framework for a systematic study of the condition-
ing causal power of a state’s approach to TJ over its foreign policy discourses and
international action. I contend that foreign policy can be explained by examining
in depth the adoption or non-adoption of the alleged duty to come to terms with
one’s violent past in the domestic context. A state’s way of approaching TJ also has
wider repercussions for the regional dynamics of the TJ norm, hence broadening
the scope of possible international implications of particular domestic applications
of TJ.
The proposed approach is rooted in the interpretivist tradition. It highlights
the importance of a deeply contextual understanding of a state’s adoption or
non-adoption of particular TJ measures6 domestically ex-ante linking its truth-and-
justice-seeking profile to its international outlook and foreign policy behavior (cf.
Guzzini 2012b, 48). Methodologically, the suggested framework underlines the im-
portance of looking closely into the reasoning provided by the political leadership
for the dismissal of particular TJ policies. It also emphasizes the acknowledgement
of the broader societal debates on which TJ measures would actually be desirable
and which are allegedly counterproductive for the “healing” and “moving on” of
the state and society in question (taking notice of the potential incompatibility of
these goals). As these choices illuminate the state’s understandings of human rights,
rule of law, the desired relationship between state and society, the normative con-
vergence or divergence from the expectations of the emerging norm of TJ, and,
relatedly, the perceived place of the country in international society, they have fun-
damental foreign policy implications.
Let us dissect each element in the proposed analytical framework in turn. First,
some parameters of OS need to be clarified in order to make the concept more op-
erative. Somers’s (1994, 618–19) highlighting of the ontological narratives (refer-
ring to who we are and laying the basis for consequent action) and public narratives
(the intersubjective webs of relationality) provides helpful guidance here. Delineat-
ing the mnemonic dimension in a (i) state’s biographical narrative (the backbone
of its OS narration), and drawing attention to (ii) the narratives of transition, in
particular, yields a more comprehensive and convincing analytical framework for
examining the international implications of a state’s adopted TJ package than the
existing accounts. To operationalize a state’s quest for its continuous sense of self
in international society, a thoroughgoing examination of the formation and rep-
resentations of the state’s biographical narrative in political, academic, and public
discourses should be undertaken first. The biographical narrative is of central im-
portance for state identity “because it is the locus through which agents ‘work out’
their understanding of social settings and the placement of their Selves in those set-
tings” (Steele 2008, 7). As endogenous identity-formation processes at the domestic
level are deeply intertwined with the engagement and reflection over the pertinent
discursive framings by the outside actors, the configuration of a state’s “I” and “me”
is entangled to the extent not to warrant an attempt at their analytical distinction
(cf. Hopf 2002). The biographical narratives of states thus emerge in perpetual
interaction with international society (layer I in Figure 1), for the biographical con-
tinuity of state “selves” is incomplete without some sense of external affirmation,
intersubjective support, and recognition (Kinnvall and Mitzen 2017, 4). Reminis-
cent of the discourses-versus-practices debate in IR, the intra- and intersubjective
6
These include, along the dimensions of criminal-judicial, political-administrative, and symbolic-representational
justice, court trials against former decision-makers, lustration policies (or banning of former officials and secret agents
from occupying public positions in the new regime), public identification of former agents, enabling access to previous
regime’s secret files, rehabilitation and restitution policies vis-à-vis victims, and various symbolic measures (such as the
establishment of truth commissions and state-sponsored memory collection, government-funded museums and other
historical research institutions, victim organizations and reconciliation programs, rewriting history textbooks, various
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approaches to the constitution of state identity, or internal and external dynamics-
driven understandings of OS, are thus more like two sides of the same coin rather
than fundamentally opposing takes on the issue.
The stories states tell about themselves are not “just stories”—they have concrete
behavioral consequences. Identities are both told and enacted. A state’s biograph-
ical narrative constitutes and maintains its self, giving life to routinized foreign
policy actions, for states allegedly seek consistency between their self-identity nar-
ratives and their behavior in international politics (Steele 2008, 3, 11). States’
self-narratives and practices send signals about their intentions to their inter-
national counterparts. Accordingly, both what is being said (in the respective
policy documents, speeches by political leaders and elites, public announce-
ments, political memoirs, academic accounts, and the media) and actually done
(policies, institutionalization, routines, practices) should be explored in conjunc-
tion, highlighting specific reasoning and legitimation moves along the way (cf.
Dunn 2006).
Fundamental political, economic, and/or ideological transitions present specific
challenges for maintaining state continuity and the consistency of its self-concept
(layer II in Figure 1). Such transitions meet Ejdus’s (2017, 10) criteria of radical self-
identity ruptures, as they generate anxiety about the unreliability of international
order, the political finitude of the collective “self,” the impermanence of relation-
ships with significant others, and the inconsistency of collective autobiographies of
actors going through a critical situation. To understand a state’s OS-seeking against
the backdrop of a major regime transition and the related expectations to “come
to terms with the past,” we need to break down its biographical narrative further,
considering the particular challenges presented for a state’s normative and spatial
continuity, respectively. If the purpose of a biographical narrative is “to meaning-
fully situate the Self and delineate its existence in time and space, to provide us
with a necessary sense of orientation about where we come from, and where we are,
or could be, going” (Berenskoetter 2014, 269), the maintenance of the mnemonic
backbone linking state’s former and emerging selves within its biographical narra-
tive becomes of key significance. As agents are deemed to be geared at achieving co-
herence between their biographical narratives and positive self-conceptions at the
highest level possible (Flockhart 2016, 816), facing up to the negative legacies of
one’s past creates tension and likely reluctance. State’s mnemonic self-vision might
be called into question and destabilized by the process of “coming to terms with
the past” (Mälksoo 2015a, 224). The normative expectations related to the adop-
tion of TJ measures could subsequently emerge as identity threats of a specific kind
(layer III in Figure 1) (cf. “normative threats,” Creppell 2011). Spatial dismember-
ing of the state further adds to the anxiety about the collective political finitude,
critically unsettling the identity of the actor in question (Ejdus 2017, 7–8). Critical
situations that lead to a major disjuncture in state’s self-concept (layer II in Figure 1)
demonstrate the closely intertwined nature of various aspects of state OS (e.g., feel-
ing at home in the world or experiencing the shattering of the basic trust vis-à-vis
international society; the biographical continuity of the state, and its particular role
identity; its self-perceived position within international society and the relationship
with others) (Ejdus 2017, 11).
Subsequently, (ii) the stories that states (and societies) tell about their experi-
ences of the fundamental transitions in the life of the collective self come into
focus. Narratives of transition are important to consider for they illuminate the
struggles related to the revision of the core biographical narrative of the state in
the context of a major upheaval and change. They also shed light on the TJ choices
a state makes, as these narratives build a connection between a political commu-
nity’s past and its future by constructing a particular normative relation. In that
sense, “[t]ransitional histories are not ‘meta’-narratives but ‘mini’-narratives, always
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Establishing the link between a state’s (ii) transitional narratives and its approach
toward TJ (A. in Figure 1) logically follows. Unpacking a state’s application of partic-
ular TJ measures in combination with the close examination of its transitional nar-
ratives provides a useful window for reading the self-conceptualization of the state in
question. I understand “foreign policy” as a combination of a state’s self-vision and
its vision of its place in the world, entailing its foreign policy doctrine, a wider for-
eign policy/security imaginary (Weldes 1999; Guzzini 2012b), and the consequent
international practices. Foreign policy thus conceived refers both to the basic de-
fense of a particular notion of the state’s self within international society, as well
as the normative projection of a state’s values and ideas at the international level.
Pressures emanating from TJ as a global normative realm, amplified by spatial dis-
ruptions in cases of state death (layer III in Figure 1), call for concrete responses to
alleviate the anxieties related to the disruption of the collective’s sense of OS. These
responses might entail rigid attachment to old routines, at times at the expense of
collective actors’ material interests or, in extreme cases, even their physical security
(Mitzen 2006). In situations of “ontological dissonance,” in which various distinct
state identities are simultaneously threatened and the necessary mitigating mea-
sures of each of the threatened identities are at odds, the resulting identity dilemma
might make avoidance the policy of choice for the collective actor (Lupovici 2012).
TJ as a normative environment triggers a discursive sense-making process whereby
challenged identities need to be acknowledged and the actor’s “dominant voice”
advanced, in support of the state’s central biographical narrative (Lupovici 2012,
815). Yet, and similarly to denial of historical crimes as a defensive measure to sus-
tain a particular state identity (Zarakol 2010), avoidance tends to perpetuate and
sustain conflicts. As a coping mechanism, while facing discrete ontological insecu-
rities, avoidance may impair an actor’s openness to new information and its ability
to engage with it (Lupovici 2012, 811).
Analyzing the reasons provided for the adoption or non-adoption of specific
truth-and-justice-seeking measures accordingly makes it possible to track the emer-
gence and dynamics of transitioning state identity and the state’s attempted man-
agement of ontological dissonance and identity dilemmas. If a state’s autobiographi-
cal narrative as an OSmarker is deemed unengageable, amplifying on another (e.g.,
a particular role identity, status-seeking in international society) might emerge as a
compensatory move. A state’s externalization of its OS-seeking thus makes it possi-
ble to hold at bay the anxiety-generating idea of having to face up to its past self.
This, in turn, contributes toward a sociologically rich and thick understanding of
the sources of the states’ international conduct.
Observing the impact of a state’s TJ politics on its foreign policy engages with
deeper causal ontology of the emergence and evolution of state foreign policy. With
Kurki (2008, 252), I take the domestic and international levels to be ontologically
intertwined, or fundamentally connected, and, therefore, also, analytically, not so
clearly separable levels of analysis in international politics. The hypothesized causal
relationship between a state’s TJ and foreign policies is consequently not implied as
a single mono-causality in the empiricist-positivist tradition of conceptualizing cau-
sation. The methodology advocated here thus reaches beyond establishing regulari-
ties between independent and dependent variables and seeks to engage in more so-
ciologically and historically grounded interpretive analysis of causal relations (Kurki
2008, 272). It proceeds from an understanding that different causes of a state’s for-
eign policy conduct are deeply intertwined. Therefore, the active powers of agents
(or the so-called efficient causes) need to be related to final causes (purposes and
reasoning provided by actors, the analysis of their intentionality) and contextual-
ized within the “constitutive” conditioning causal powers of rules and norms as well
as material conditions (Kurki 2008, 296–97). The causal effect of a state’s truth-and-
justice-seeking policies on its foreign policy are hypothesized to follow most closely
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generally, “ways of thinking” “according to which social life is made” (for instance,
by the agents’ forming of their identities, intentions, decisions, and actions). This
effect is thus distinct from that of material conditions (“out of”) as well as from
the extrinsic causes, such as efficient (actor/action “by which”) and final causes
(reason/purpose “for the sake of”) (Kurki 2008, 220–24). The causal relationship
between a state’s TJ and foreign policies could thus be described as of a “constrain-
ing and enabling” type, rather than an active “pushing and pulling” kind (Kurki
2008, 225). In the spirit of “how” causality (Vennesson 2008, 232), this approach
entails determining how the adoption or non-adoption of various TJ measures is
causal for a state’s international outlook and behavior, as well as concrete foreign
policies in particular areas, and how reckoning with the antecedent regime’s hu-
man rights violations interacts with other causal forces affecting a state’s foreign
policy.
Methodologically, accounting for the causal effects of a state’s TJ politics on its
foreign policy thus needs to be deeply and thickly contextualized with the analytical
tools of poststructuralist discourse analysis (Hansen 2006; Hopf 2002) and inter-
pretive process-tracing (Guzzini 2011, 2012). The advantage of discourse analysis
relies in its ability to avoid the anthropomorphization of the state and the difficul-
ties of translating emotions from the individual to the state level (Morozov 2015,
60). Interpretive process-tracing, in its turn, takes the diverse interpretations actors
themselves give to their state identity disjuncture (shaping consequently both state’s
truth-and-justice-seeking and foreign policies) as the starting point of the analysis.
Careful empirical checking of how particular inputs have become translated into
policy responses makes it possible to control the risk of equifinality and spurious
relationships (Guzzini 2012a, 4). This could be done by adopting Lebow’s (2014)
model of inefficient causation—a multistep searching for connections between and
among causes at multiple levels of inquiry. As an elaboration of singular causation,
Lebow’s approach offers a detailed variation on the theme of how-causality, seek-
ing to account for how various frames of reference, processes, mechanisms, and
other features of context (such as confluences, actor goals, and interactions) may
be responsible for particular outcomes (Lebow 2014, 65). Importantly, this kind
of causal analysis is wary of determining a single, original cause for specific out-
comes. Causes remain hypothesized as, at the end of the day, “there is no way of
effectively establishing causation” (Lebow 2014, 144). Inefficient causation there-
fore aims at developing “layered accounts of human behavior in lieu of law-like
statements,” highlighting that outcomes (along with their meanings) are context
dependent (Lebow 2014, 146; Guzzini 2015). This framework makes it possible to
provide a deep qualitative reconstruction of a state’s evolution in the field of TJ, with
a focus on the meanings that agents attach to the social reality. Actors’ own justifi-
cations of their conduct are key for understanding their foreign policy actions and
state’s international practice. This approach resonates with Pouliot’s “sobjectivist”
methodology (Pouliot 2007, 360), combining induction (in order to recover sub-
jective meanings), the objectification of meanings in their intersubjective context,
and their setting in motion through historicization.
The mechanism of OS-seeking in the TJ and foreign policy nexus is hence not
causal in a deterministic sense. The “triggering effect” on a mechanism (Guzzini
2017) may be amplified by the actor’s sensitivity to intersubjective pressures and
historical stigmatization (Zarakol 2010), its late entrance to international society
(Zarakol 2011), significant loss of territory along with the fundamental disruption
of the long-ingrained normative ideals, and status anxieties unleashed by the ac-
tor’s fundamentally shifted position in the international system (cf. “peace anxi-
eties,” Rumelili 2015b). While the pursuit of OS is arguably central to the human
condition (Browning 2016, 161), the strategies of aspiring to a sense of OS can sig-
nificantly vary, with major consequences for states’ predisposition for cooperation
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Table 1. A simplified matrix of the TJ and foreign policy nexus
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The proposed framework anticipates two crude models of pursuing the politics
of truth-and-justice-seeking in “transitional states”: (A1.) a reflective, and (A2.) a
mnemonical security-oriented approach (as outlined in Table 1). While these ideal
types naturally have significant variations in practice, they are still useful point-
ers for understanding the basic ways of handling the past by states in transition.
Whereas I consider OS-seeking to be a broadly generalizable dynamic informing
states’ engagement with the emerging norm of TJ, states’ embracing of the norm
in practice, and the related international ripple effects vary depending on the
actors’ position in and navigation of various social, normative, and material rank-
ings. Presumably, pursuing a blatantly mnemonic security-oriented approach in re-
lation to coming to terms with historical human rights abuses and international
wrongdoings is more readily observable in relatively weighty states with more distant
historical issues and a larger perceived “wiggle room” for noncompliance (e.g., Rus-
sia, Turkey, Japan, and Israel). The foreign policy effects of the proposed framework
could be less palpable in the immediate postconflict cases, susceptible to consider-
ably stronger pressures by the international community to abide by the expectations
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Theoretically, the anxiety unleashed by critical situations may constitute the emo-
tional turning point that “translates the unassimilable information into cognitive
shocks and thus makes critical reflection about habits possible” (Rumelili 2015b,
19). The anxieties generated by fundamental transitions and the ensuing pressures
to undergo TJ might thus open up space for breaking the habitual conflict pat-
terns and the intersubjective negotiation and reformulation of identities (Rumelili
2015b), embracing and establishing a more “just memory” (Nguyen 2013) of the
divisive past events in the present. A reflective approach to TJ accordingly tends to
contribute toward a more systematic and comprehensive adoption of a range of TJ
measures. Showcasing ability for introspection, adaptability, and aptitude to cope
with change in reckoning with the legacies of the past self (Craib 1998, 72) indi-
cates a heightened capacity for a self-reflexive, creative, and innovative engagement
with the changing world (Giddens 1991, 40–41) and, consequently, lays the basis
for a more cooperative stance in a state’s foreign policy outlook.
An alternative dynamic is still possible, reflecting an urge to sustain the known
parameters of the self vis-à-vis the world. Quite alike to peace anxieties that may en-
gender attempts to restore the antecedent “objects of fear, systems of meaning and
standards of moral purpose” and thus a longing for a return to conflict/previous
state of being (Rumelili 2015b, 13), the unsettling critical situation might not be
capitalized upon as a moment of opportunity but dreaded and responded to with
mnemonical security-seeking instead. The range of emotions (including anxiety,
nostalgia, ambivalence, frustration, shame, and humiliation) generated by the jux-
taposition of a state’s past self with the liberal human rights–imbued standards of
the global TJ norm may unleash a reaction of antecedent identity validation, rather
than its critical revision by the state (cf. Lupovici 2016). A mnemonical security-
orientation discourages state’s critical introspection. The adoption of TJ accord-
ingly tends to remain limited or highly selective (to the degree of its substantive dis-
missal). A mnemonical security-orientation in a state’s approach to TJ might include
the securitization of subjectivity (or an intensified search for a single stable identity;
Kinnvall 2004, 749), radical othering of alternative mnemonical accounts, the mili-
tarization of memory by means of punitive memory laws, and by consequence, the
prolongation or renewal of (mnemo)political conflict (cf. Browning 2016, 161).
This raises moral issues and practical policy concerns for the international TJ
norm promoters. The TJ and foreign policy nexus highlights not just the question of
how communities cope with their self-inflicted scarring ruptures (Steele 2013b) in
between various external pressures and internal demands. It also probes the ethos
of international community’s involvement in collective actors’ attempts to tackle
their scars in one way or another, due to the implications of chosen TJ approaches
for these actors’ foreign policy behavior along the conflictual-cooperative range. An
ethically appealing TJ process avoids “bracketing” off certain ways of remembering
the past by other communities (cf. Giddens 1991) for the sake of the actor’s own
sense of mnemonical, and by extension, ontological security. As Browning (2016,
161) puts it: “ontological security-seeking strategies are most ethically defensible
when they prioritise an emphasis on self-reflexivity and openness to plurality. . . .
potentially even embracing anxiety as a starting point for living a more authen-
tic and morally fulfilling life.” A reflective approach to TJ not only confronts the
scars of the past, probing alternative notions of responsibility and accountability
in global politics (Steele 2011, 2013a, 2013b), but also entails acknowledgement
that empathetic and cooperative foreign policy disposition post–fundamental tran-
sitions necessitates opening up to the “other in oneself”—learning to see the par-
allel presence of humanity and inhumanity in both one’s own self and in one’s
historical enemy or victimized others. A just memory demands a shift toward an
ethics of recognition of “how the inhuman inhabits the human” in both remem-
bering one’s own and remembering others (Nguyen 2016). In a “doubled ethical
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as being open-ended and in flux, rather than being satisfied with fixity and con-
clusiveness” (Nguyen 2013, 151). Such ethics of memory embraces the criticism of
the achievability and ethical innocence of OS aspirations in the first place, acknowl-
edging “the subject’s opacity, contingency, non-innocence, and even expendabil-
ity” instead (Rossdale 2015, 369). Mnemonical security-orientation in TJ policy is
not only ethically problematic vis-à-vis the others but also counterproductive to the
self’s own sense of ontological wholeness, continuity, and safety (Mälksoo 2015a).
This approach to TJ is furthermore prone to sustain conflicts in the international
relations of the actor in question. Yet, the ethics of recalling others is an explicitly
political choice (Nguyen 2013, 153) and comes at an emotional and political cost
for various concerned parties.
Balancing the reefs of OS-seeking in the process of dealing with one’s violent and
repressive past legacies should not amount to the former “perpetrator” state’s usurp-
ing of the right to oversee the memory work of its historical “enemy” or “victimized”
states. The international TJ community therefore needs to think hard how best to
support cases of prolonged and inconclusive transitions of prominent, mnemoni-
cal security-oriented countries. To illustrate the empirical purchase of the analytical
framework, and the related normative and practical political dilemmas for the TJ
norm entrepreneurs, I now turn to the hard case of Russia’s political handling of its
Soviet past.
The Hard Case of Post-Soviet Russia
The repercussions of Russia’s handling of its Soviet past in its historical memory-
laden foreign policies at the bilateral, regional, and global levels highlight the cen-
tral theoretical and methodological claims this article has made. Post-Soviet Russia
probes the scope conditions of the allegedly general obligation of accountability
for the past and the role of a state’s perceived position in international society influ-
encing its OS-seeking behavior after major transitions. Russia has been frequently
dismissed in scholarly debates as an example of TJ failure since its official record
in various dimensions of addressing the legacy of the Soviet regime has been either
half-hearted or outright revisionist during the consolidation of the Putin regime
(Andrieu 2011; Mälksoo 2015b). Methodologically, the exploration of Russia’s id-
iosyncratic TJ policies, and their international implications, underscores the need
to be attentive to the context in order to better distinguish between the instrumen-
tal compliance with an international expectation to “come to terms with” one’s past
and the internalization of the TJ norm by a society in question. Putting Russia in
the empirical spotlight also makes it possible to bridge a gap in the literature on
reckoning with the past in IR, wherein scholarly interest in the Russian case has not
nearly reached the levels of scholarly interest in post–Second World War Germany
and Japan. Meanwhile, the rich scholarship on Russian memory politics has yet to
conceptualize the implications of Russia’s political handling of its communist past
for its international behavior. However, “memory is clearly crucial to understanding
the case of Russia’s international politics” (Neumann 2013, 24).
A definitive account of the Russian case remains beyond the bounds of this ar-
ticle. My goal here is to provide in broad brushstrokes a summary illustration of
the framework in the hope that it would serve as a focal point for further em-
pirical studies. Resonating with Götz’s (2017) call for more synthetic accounts of
Russian foreign policy, the aim is not to refute the existing explanations of Russia’s
post-Soviet foreign policies (e.g., Hopf 2002; Legvold 2007; Larson and Shevchenko
2010; Neumann and Pouliot 2011; Tsygankov 2012, 2013) but to emphasize the cur-
rently overlooked importance of a state’s TJ politics in informing its foreign policy
behavior in particular ways.
There are also important caveats in relation to applying the vocabulary of TJ in
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Soviet regime7 and the consequent varieties of politically handling the Soviet past
during late communism and the post-communist era,8 the Russian case pokes the
very nature of transition in TJ: while the country has certainly undergone a change
of power since the Soviet era, it remains an open question how substantive this
change has really been.9 Most TJ mechanisms never really took hold as part of the
Russian politics of transition. Except for the increasingly persecuted work of the
Memorial Society,10 the piecemeal rehabilitation of the victims of the most serious
political repressions and the guarded de-Stalinization campaign of the Medvedev
administration, Russia’s reckoning with its predecessor’s repressive legacy has re-
mained eclectic or downright revisionist during the Putin era (Khapaeva 2016).
In Russia, TJ has been most tangible in regard to state-led policies involving the
symbolic-representational acknowledgement of victims. Most conspicuously, Russia
has essentially ignored the question of punishing perpetrators of the political re-
pressions and gross human rights violations of its antecedent regime (Nuzov 2014).
The occasional overlapping of the perpetrator-victim categories in Soviet history
has further exacerbated the difficulty of “coming to terms with a suicide” for Russia
(Etkind 2013; Viola 2013).
In light of the considerable continuity between the Soviet and post-Soviet elites in
Russia (Sakwa 2011; Gill 2013; Nuzov 2014), the state’s general aversion to assum-
ing responsibility for past-related claims and toward the political and legal reassess-
ment of the Soviet past is not unanticipated. The overall post-communist transition
of Russia has purportedly produced a hybrid regime (Robertson 2011), which is se-
lectively mimicking the normative language of the Western community, rather than
fully abiding with democratic practices. Andrieu (2011, 200) has accordingly char-
acterized the Russian case for its “faux” or pseudo-TJ interventions as an example
wherein these measures have not aimed at democratization and the protection of
victims’ rights as much as at legitimizing the new political elite. The presidential
commission to “counter attempts at falsifying history against Russia’s interests” (es-
tablished in 2009, now disbanded) is a symptomatically Orwellian initiative of the
kind (Brandenberger 2013).
I posit that it is as vital to closely examine Russia’s reasoning for not adopt-
ing certain TJ measures as the limited set the country has in fact pursued in its
process of “coming to terms with” its Soviet past. Clunan (2009) has offered a
comprehensive attempt to incorporate temporality, historical memory, and aspi-
rations into the explanation of the emergence of state’s national interests and
status-seeking in international politics on the example of Russia. Her observation
that “the past self can serve as the key identity standard, particularly in times of
change, and the past becomes the benchmark against which the self attempts to
verify its present identity” (Clunan 2009, 27) provides an important signpost for
illuminating the causal dynamics in the TJ and foreign policy nexus in the Rus-
sian case. Russia’s way of reckoning with its antecedent regime’s legacy has had
considerable repercussions for its relations with its former Soviet dependents and
foreign policies in various multilateral settings, ranging from its politics of human
rights and state accountability to pursuing particular discourses of historical jus-
tice in international fora, such as the UN, Council of Europe, and the OSCE.
As the “state continuator” (gosudarstvo-prodolzhatel’) of the Soviet Union in inter-
national legal terms, the Russian Federation has been persistent in refusing to
7
That is, Stalinist totalitarianism and the subsequent post-totalitarian system with more selective forms of repression
compared to the earlier large-scale arbitrary terror.
8
Notably, late communism and even the early Yeltsin-era were marked by a more reflective approach to TJ in Russia,
whereas particularly the Putin years have showcased an increasing search for mnemonical security.
9
As epitomized, in particular, by the continuity and relative power of the internal state security structures, or the
KGB-FSB link in post-Soviet Russia.
10
For a recent notable grassroots initiative, see also the “last address” project (http://www.poslednyadres.ru,
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assume legal responsibility for the internationally wrongful acts of the Soviet regime,
within and beyond its current borders. Russia’s lack of political penitence toward
the Eastern European nations and states affected by the Soviet repressive policies
renders it an antipode of a “sorry state,” notably unwilling to publicly express con-
trition for past wrongdoings in order to promote reconciliation between the for-
mer repressor state and the repressed (Lind 2008). Meanwhile, the current Rus-
sian regime has appropriated the discourses of human rights, genocide prevention,
and Holocaust remembrance for identity-political projects abroad.11 Most recently,
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its support for the separatists in east-
ern Ukraine have been shaped by mnemonical undercurrents in complex ways:
Russian media has systematically demonized prodemocratic forces in Ukraine as
“Nazis,” insinuating their intention to erase the historical memory of the Soviet vic-
tory in the war against Nazism and perpetrate genocide against Russian and Jewish
minorities (Fedor 2015).
A search for a continuous sense of self is crucial for understanding the linkages
between Russia’s way of handling its communist past and its engagement with the
neighbors and world at large in the post-Soviet era. Russia’s long-time reluctance to
systematically reckon with its antecedent regime’s repressive legacy (Adler 2012a;
Khapaeva 2016) is consistent with its attempts to sustain the basic stability of a pos-
itive sense of its national self. The extent of adopted TJ measures, along with the
close and thick reading of the accompanying political and public debates thus shed
light on the issue of what kind of subject Russia wants to be.
The crumbling and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition from
communism presented Russia with a constitutive crisis about its continuous state
identity, an attempted solution to which involved assuming the position of “the con-
tinuator state of the USSR.” The country’s sense of confidence in its own continuity
was significantly shaken, leading to a major disjuncture in state identity due to the
interruption of previously taken-for-granted self-understandings and foreign policy
role positions (cf. Guzzini 2012a, 3). As a radical disruption, the collapse of the
USSR and the Soviet order forced the emerging Russian state and society to address
fundamental questions of existence, finitude, relations, and autobiography (layer
II in Figure 1; Ejdus 2017, 19). The situation of ontological dissonance ensued as
the country struggled to transit to a “normal” liberal democratic and capitalist state,
whilst self-conscious of its backwardness vis-à-vis Europe, nostalgic about, and even-
tually clinging to the image of a “great power” (associating “greatness” with the So-
viet past).12 Combined with the considerable loss of territory (i.e., spatial pressures
to revise the old self-concept),13 radical disruption of the ingrained normative hori-
zon (collapse of the communist system), and newly unleashed status anxieties in
international society, the country was faced with the accumulation of threats to its
consistent sense of self, calling for a critical revision of its biographical narrative
((i) in Figure 1). Being suddenly forced into the role of a disciple rather than a
revered and feared competitor, Russia suffered from an inferiority complex toward
Europe during the post-communist transition due to the country’s innate striving
to be nothing but a “great power” (Neumann 2016, 1383). The trope of loss has
consequently remained the most widely used symbolic device employed by Russians
11
As exemplified by the Russian Foreign Ministry report on the situation with human rights in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2013).
12
Powerful evidence of Soviet nostalgia at the collected level of social memory is provided in Svetlana Alexievich’s
oral history projects, particularly Secondhand Time (2017). Sociological polls have consistently demonstrated the popu-
larity of Stalin as a leader of a strong state and the related status nostalgia in post-Soviet Russia.
13
It is in this context we should interpret Putin’s famous words on the collapse of the Soviet Union being the
greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century (“Poslanie Prezidenta” 2005). Losing a considerable portion
of the formerly inhabited space, along with millions of Russian compatriots to the newly independent states at Russia’s
borders has compelled the country to fundamentally reconsider its historical self-definition as an empire rather than a
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in their attempts to make sense of the Soviet experience in the post-Soviet context
(Oushakine 2009), informing various public narratives of transition in the country
((ii) in Figure 1). In the tumultuous early 1990s, the Russian political elites fol-
lowed the West without ever accepting Russia’s secondary status: it was maintained
that Russia had always been and remains a great world power (Reshetnikov 2011,
153).
Russia’s post-Soviet self remains unsettled, for no consensus has emerged about
the Soviet past in the country (Etkind 2013, 246), and Russia’s self-definition vis-à-vis
Europe / the West is marred with ambiguities. Morozov (2015) shows how Russia’s
application of European-modeled measures to its subaltern realities has generally
led to failure (e.g., in the post-Soviet economic collapse ordained by liberal Western-
izers). While subsequent anxiety and exasperation strengthened vocal contestation
of the West, present-day Russia still remains normatively utterly dependent on the
Western hegemonic discourses, he maintains. The anxiety generated by the unset-
tled self was hardly helped by the fact that Russia, unlike several of its Central and
East European counterparts, did not have much of a democratic tradition to return
to after the collapse of the Soviet regime, and its post-Soviet transition therefore
“came with no clear set of rules or paths to follow” (Oushakine 2009, 4). Compared
to the de-Nazification policies adopted in Germany under international control af-
ter the end of the Second World War, Russia’s de-Sovietization happened in very dif-
ferent circumstances after the unraveling of the Soviet empire. While post–World
War II Germany was stigmatized by the Western Allies and the Soviet Union in-
ter alia by being refused a veritable foreign and defense policy (Adler-Nissen 2014,
156–57), no systematic normative requirements to reckon with the violent legacy of
Soviet communist regime and restrain its successor’s international ambitions were
presented by the Western community for Russia emerging from the shambles of
the USSR. The Charter of Paris (1990) and the ECHR provided only a general nor-
mative framework, along with a degree of self-restraint applied in the early years
of post-communist Russia through its disengagement from a global military role.
In all, Russia’s incentives to socially conform to the emerging norm to pursue TJ
have been minimal, as no specific rewards or punishments have been insisted on
by Russia’s peers in the post–Cold War international community. The lack of exter-
nal demands has further added to Russia’s difficulty in incorporating abuses of the
Soviet past into its post-Soviet self-narrative or facing up to the “other in oneself”
for the dreaded undermining effect on the state identity that Russia has sought to
reinforce (layers I and III in Figure 1).
The costs entailed with reckoning with the violent legacies, traumas, and crimes
of the past are not just emotionally charged but have tangible political conse-
quences. The unqualified renouncing of the Soviet Union and the communist
regime would have complicated the effortless inheriting of the “state continua-
tor” (and more generally great power) status (including a seat among the UN Se-
curity Council’s P5) for post-Soviet Russia.14 Russia’s state-level “strategic silence”
(Knutsen 2016) about certain problematic chapters in the life of its antecedent
self is thus consistent with the basic premises of OS theory.15 Since Russia’s insti-
tutionalization of the TJ norm is modest (A. in Figure 1),16 state TJ policies have
been selective and controversial, mapping the dynamics of invoking the norm in
the domestic political discourse becomes ever more significant. Investigating Rus-
sian understandings of the legitimacy of the TJ norm at the domestic level makes
it possible, in turn, to shed light on the country’s broader international outlook
14
On Russia’s “obsession” with status, see Malinova (2014); Heller, Forsberg, and Wolff (2014).
15
Similar reluctance towards integrating painful colonial and imperial legacies in contemporary self-narratives can
be observed in case of many Western states as well.
16
For detailed accounts of Russia’s choices in adopting particular TJ measures, see Bobrinsky et al. (2017); Calhoun
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on issues as varied as human rights,17 individual accountability18 and state respon-
sibility,19 and the pursuance of ideas of “historical justice” in various international
formats—all of which point at the sphere of foreign policy as an important “issue
area” for assessing the salience of the TJ norm for Russia (cf. Cortell and Davis
2000, 71).
Such an analytic venture starts by asking detailed questions about how TJ has
worked institutionally, socially, and politically in the country, instead of merely
checking whether or not Russia fits with the various matrixes of TJ measures, and
determining the ripple effects of individual TJ-related moves (cf. Kurki 2008, 271).
It is about providing a thick, multilevel description of how reckoning with the
communist-era human rights violations and international crimes has been actually
understood in Russia; how this understanding has changed throughout the post-
communist period (including perestroika years as a particularly volatile and discur-
sively illuminating stage of immediate transition between the Soviet regime and the
new Russian state, accompanied by Gorbachev’s forthcoming and more cooperative
“new thinking” in the Soviet foreign policy); and which reason attributions have
framed various TJ-related moves. Coupling Russia’s respective understandings with
state- and society-led truth-and-justice-seeking initiatives along with its historical sen-
sitivities toward the Western stigmatization and Orientalization of Russia recognizes
the complex international-domestic dynamics at play in both the emergence of the
country’s truth-and-justice-seeking policies domestically and their international re-
verberations (layers I and III in Figure 1). The post-communist Russian debates over
the (non)prosecution of the perpetrators of the Soviet violators of human rights
(and the related definitional difficulties thereof) are of central interest, along with
related commemoration, memorialization, and educational practices, various his-
tory commissions in Russia’s bilateral relations with its former Soviet satellites, and
the prevailing attitudes toward official apologies for the criminal legacy of the Soviet
regime in Russia’s public diplomacy.
A close reading of Russia’s post-Soviet discourses and practices of TJ contributes
to a deeper understanding of Russia’s preferences for a global normative order,
the contemporary dynamics of its international identity and political outreach, and
its current regime’s perception of and attempted mobilization against certain nor-
mative threats (e.g., neo-Nazism). In Lebow’s (2014) terms, Russia’s idiosyncratic
approach to TJ could be assumed to be a necessary but insufficient condition for
explaining the country’s post-Soviet foreign policy dynamics. By constraining and
enabling Russia’s foreign policy-making agents, the country’s post-communist pol-
itics of truth-and-justice-seeking provides a specific contextual backdrop, meaning
and conditions of possibility for particular empirical patterns in the country’s for-
eign policy (cf. Weldes and Duvall 2001, 196).
The foreign policy implications of Russia’s political handling of its Soviet past
can be delineated along bilateral, regional, and global dimensions (B. in Figure 1).
The first range includes, for instance, Russia’s guardedly regretful stance adopted
toward the Katyn massacre in its relations with Poland in 2010, along with a number
of bilateral “history commissions” established in recent years with Poland, Ukraine,
Latvia, and Lithuania. Russia’s state commission to counteract attempts of “falsifica-
tion of history to the detriment of Russia’s interests,” legislation on the appropriate
17
The Russian Federation ratified the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1998, but reacting to the
flow of unfavorable rulings by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the State Duma adopted amendments
to the Law on Constitutional Court in 2015, enabling Russia not to implement judgments of the European Court if
deemed in conflict with the constitution.
18
As embodied in the International Criminal Court (ICC). Russia is not a state party of the Rome Statute of the
ICC.
19
In Russia’s case, this is mainly understood geopolitically, with reference to special international responsibilities
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and rightful frames of remembering the role of the USSR in World War II (Art.
354.1. of the Russian Penal Code), and handling of the relevant cases at the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have a wider resonance in the Eastern
European region. The global orbit of Russia’s translation of its way of handling the
Soviet past entails the country’s fight against neo-Nazism in the UN and its forceful
refutation of the East European policies that have sought the international con-
demnation of “communist crimes” in the OSCE and the Council of Europe among
other international fora (Mälksoo 2014).
The basic empirical upshot of this brief illustration is as follows: Russia’s inability
to settle the problem of its ontological consistency and continuity domestically (or
its deeply ambivalent state-level settlement of its relationship toward the repressive
legacy of the Soviet state) has contributed to a more aggressive form of OS-seeking
behavior in the post-Soviet era internationally. The incongruity between the enor-
mity of the repressions and crimes of the Soviet regime to reckon with and the
limited politics of accountability actually pursued has been further amplified by
the conflict between the emerging global normative expectations related to states’
politics of TJ, Russia’s domestic normative order, and its sought standing in the
contemporary international society. Grounding Russia’s international behavior on
the analysis of the political handling of its communist past dovetails with Allison’s
(2013, 18) argument on the Russian approach to military intervention, according
to which “the Russian view of global norms and law . . . interacts in significant ways
with conceptions of regional and domestic state order.” Arguably, great powers are
particularly motivated to reproduce at the international level the values enshrined
in their domestic political cultures (Morris 2005).
This is why the Russian case matters for IR norm constructivists and TJ scholars. As
Allison’s important study of Russia’s approach tomilitary intervention and the norm
of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) demonstrates, an examination of the emerging
global standards of pertinent conduct (and their contestation thereof) needs to
be juxtaposed with the way “major states’ commitment to global standards may be
influenced by standards of conduct defined within and for a region” (Allison 2013,
18–19). States might wish to keep their own regional order in a different register
as far as the particular norm’s global expectations and restraints are concerned
(Allison 2013, 19; cf. Kaczmarska 2015).
Ontological insecurity arising from the half-hearted approach toward reckoning
with the Soviet/communist legacy hence comes across as both a symptom and a trig-
ger of Russia’s growing assertiveness in international politics, from Ukraine (Nuzov
2017) and Syria to transatlantic relations. Russia’s ominous record with human
rights and the rule of law along with its kneejerk tendency to claim droit de regard
of the mnemopolitical developments of the former Soviet republics20 illustrate the
twofold precariousness of its current predicament in relation to the TJ-foreign pol-
icy nexus: Russia’s protracted post-Soviet ontological insecurity about its continuity
and status and its ensuing attempts to compensate for this unease on the interna-
tional plane. This is the irony of OS-seeking geared toward the uncritical safeguard-
ing of the past for the sake of sustaining a continuous self-concept: it tends to beat
the purpose of enhancing a state’s sense of “security in being” in practice (Mälksoo
2015a). The mnemonical security-orientation of Russia’s TJ and foreign policies
illuminates the ethical pitfalls of rigid securitization of one’s self-concept,21 the
20
For instance, by meddling in the “Bronze Soldier” crisis in Estonia in 2007 (Mälksoo 2009) or seeking to establish
common declassification and secrecy policies for the Commonwealth of Independent States (Kramer 2012, 208–10).
21
As exemplified by Russia’s “memory law” on World War II remembrance of 2014, criminalizing public dissemina-
tion of “knowingly false information” about the activities of the USSR during the Second World War, and stipulating
concrete penalties in case of the law’s violation. The law further banned disseminating information expressing “obvious
disrespect to the society” concerning days of military glory and Russia’s memorial dates, as well as publicly insulting the
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radical othering of alternative mnemonical accounts,22 and unreflectiveness about
the “other in oneself.”
Conclusion
This article has pointed at the lack of systematic attention on the connection be-
tween states’ (non-)adoption of particular TJ measures domestically and their inter-
national outlook. Bringing together largely disconnected literatures on TJ, OS, and
norms in IR, I have offered a conceptual and methodological framework for study-
ing the purported TJ and foreign policy nexus. The proposed analytical framework
provides a fuller understanding and operationalization of state OS-seeking in inter-
national politics, rendered as a generic social mechanism, which makes it possible
to systematically link states’ TJ and foreign policies. It sheds light on the interaction
between states’ identity and international norms and the consequent policy effects
of this interaction.
Via this gap-bridging exercise, I have sought to provide a compelling groundwork
for engaging in theory-building on the issue of how the failure to undertake major
TJ measures translates into a more conflictual OS-seeking behavior at the inter-
national level. The analytical model, distinguishing between a reflective (A1.) and
mnemonical security-oriented approach to TJ (A2.), and linking the twofold taxon-
omy to a state’s proneness for cooperation or conflict (B1.1. and B2.2. in Figure 1),
simultaneously makes it possible to draw further-reaching conclusions about the
role of the state’s perceived status in the implicit hierarchies of international soci-
ety. This is presumed to contribute to a state’s comprehensive or highly selective
adoption of a particular TJ policy, in turn.
I utilized the example of post-Soviet Russia in order to illuminate its struggle
for biographical continuity and sustained status in international society. While the
empirical sketch remains to be comprehensively substantiated along the suggested
lines, the analytical model should also be subjected to further testing and conse-
quent nuancing in various empirical contexts, such as Turkey, Israel and Japan.
Conjoined by their late entrance to and/or stigmatization in international society,
and a spotty, missing, or problematic record in dealing with past crimes and human
rights violations, these cases vary along the assertive/conflictual and cooperative/
peaceful scale. They could further test the role of ontological dissonance, status
anxieties, and state’s relational power in the interaction between the instrumental
use and/or the internalization of the TJ norm, and state identity in international
society.
This article has made a threefold contribution. First, acknowledging the effects of
TJ policies on international state behavior adds to the understanding of the sources
and dynamics of state identity, foreign, and security policies. This is key for Rus-
sian foreign policy and historical memory scholarship, for “Russia’s permanent and
sometimes agonizing quest for identity” has been the “ultimately most poignant in-
fluence” on Russian foreign policy (Legvold 2007, 20).
Secondly, by going beyond the dichotomy of states adopting or not adopting TJ
mechanisms, the framework also contributes to TJ studies, as it highlights the dis-
tinct reception and international reverberations of significant non-Western states’
engagement with the allegedly global norm of TJ and points at the normative and
practical policy implications for TJ advocates. Besides triangulating the proposed
analytical framework with the existing analytical models on the sources of states’ in-
ternational conduct, and horizontal testing of its applicability to other cases, further
law was Vladimir Luzgin in 2016, a Russian blogger who has taken his case to the ECtHR under the legal representation
by a senior lawyer at the Memorial Human Rights Centre.
22
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research could address how Russia’s selective and instrumental appropriation of TJ
mechanisms could potentially blur the original liberal substance of the TJ concept.
As such, and finally, the proposed framework broadens the research agenda on
international norms of IR constructivists by focusing on the complex interaction of
the emerging TJ normative duty with a state’s perception of its self.
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